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Abstract
Federated learning allows multiple users to collaboratively train a shared classifica-
tion model while preserving data privacy. This approach, where model updates are
aggregated by a central server, was shown to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks: a
malicious user can alter the shared model to arbitrarily classify specific inputs from
a given class. In this paper, we analyze the effects of backdoor attacks in federated
meta-learning, where users train a model that can be adapted to different sets of
output classes using only a few training examples. While the ability to adapt could,
in principle, make federated learning more robust to backdoor attacks when new
training examples are benign, we find that even 1-shot poisoning attacks can be very
successful and persist after additional training. To address these vulnerabilities, we
propose a defense mechanism inspired by matching networks, where the class of
an input is predicted from the cosine similarity of its features with a support set of
labeled examples. By removing the decision logic from the model shared with the
federation, success and persistence of backdoor attacks are greatly reduced.
1 Introduction
Federated learning [1] allows multiple users to collaboratively train a shared prediction model without
sharing their private data. Similarly to the parameter server architecture, model updates computed
locally by each user (e.g., weight gradients in a neural network) are aggregated by a server that
applies them and sends the updated model to the federation. User datasets are never shared, while
the aggregation of multiple updates makes it difficult for an attacker in the federation to reconstruct
training examples of another user. Additional privacy threats have also been addressed in federated
learning: for example, secure aggregation techniques have been proposed where users send encrypted
updates that the server applies to an encrypted model [2, 3].
While the use of data from multiple users allows for improved prediction accuracy with respect to
models trained separately, federated learning has been shown to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks:
a member of the federation can send model updates produced using malicious training examples
where the output class indicates the presence of a hidden backdoor key, rather than benign input
features. This kind of attack can be successful even after a single malicious update, and it is difficult
to detect in practice because (1) the attacker can introduce the backdoor in the model with minimal
accuracy reduction in the main classification task, and (2) malicious updates can be masked within
the distribution of benign ones [4, 5, 6].
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Another limitation of federated learning is due to the requirement that all users share the same output
classes (e.g., the outputs of a neural network and their associated labels) and that, for each class, the
distribution of input examples of different users be similar. Recent approaches to gradient-based
meta-learning [7, 8, 9] provide a compelling alternative for federated scenarios: rather than training a
model for a specific set of output classes, these methods try to learn model parameters that can be
adapted very quickly to new classification tasks (with entirely different output classes) using only a
few training examples (or “shots”). Meta-learning also allows users with different data distributions
to jointly train a meta-model that they can adapt to their specific tasks. For example, in federated face
recognition, each user trains a model using classification tasks from a distinct dataset (e.g., images of
friends and relatives), but all users share the goal of training a meta-model to recognize human faces.
While the use of meta-learning in a federated setting and its privacy concerns were explored by
previous work [10, 11], the influence of backdoor attacks on federated meta-learning has not been
investigated. Since meta-models have the ability to adapt to new classification tasks very quickly,
it is unclear whether a backdoor attack can succeed and persist despite many users sharing benign
updates of the meta-model, or after fine-tuning the meta-model for a specific task with benign data.
This paper investigates backdoor attacks on federated meta-learning with the following contributions.
(1) We design a set of experiments to illustrate the effects of this kind of attack under different
scenarios. Our experimental results, presented in Section 4, show that backdoor attacks (triggering
intentional misclassification) can be successful even after a single malicious update from the attacker:
in our Omniglot experiment, 80% of backdoor examples are misclassified after a single poisoned
update, regardless of whether they are from attacker’s training set or from a separate validation
set, while meta-testing accuracy is reduced by only 1%; in our mini-ImageNet experiment, 75% of
backdoor training examples and 50% of backdoor validation examples are misclassified after a single
update, with 10% reduction of meta-testing accuracy. Moreover, the effects of the attack are persistent,
despite long meta-training after the attack (using only benign examples), or after fine-tuning of the
meta-model by a benign user. After many rounds of benign meta-training on Omniglot, 50% of
backdoor examples are still misclassified as the attack target, in both training and validation datasets;
on mini-ImageNet, success rates of the attack are reduced only from 75% to 70% (training) and from
50% to 43% (validation). On both datasets, extensive fine-tuning of the meta-model by a benign user
reduces the attack success rate by less than 5%; we also show that simply increasing the learning rate
during fine-tuning reduces the success rate of the backdoor attack (from 80% to as low as 20%), but
also degrades meta-testing accuracy dramatically (from 99% to as low as 40%).
(2) As an effective defense mechanism, we propose (in Section 5) a sanitizing fine-tuning process
inspired by matching networks [7], where the class of an input is predicted from the cosine similarity
of its weighted features with a support set of examples for each class. By locally training and
controlling the importance of extracted features for each class, our proposed defense mechanism
can reduce the success rate of backdoor attacks, from as high as 90% to less than 20% (Omniglot
training/validation and mini-ImageNet training) and from 50% to 20% (mini-ImageNet validation) in
just a few iterations. In contrast with other defense mechanisms for federated learning [12, 13, 14,
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21], our method does not require any third-party to examine user updates, and
it is thus compatible with secure update aggregation methods. In addition, we make no assumptions
about the distribution of training data at different users or the required fraction of benign users, thus
enabling the safe application of federated learning to a broader set of scenarios.
2 Federated Meta-Learning
Federated learning among M users proceeds in rounds: at each round t, the parameter server
randomly selects Mround 6 M users and transmits the shared model θtG (e.g., the neural network
weights). Each selected user i initializes the local model θti to θ
t
G, performs E training steps, and then
transmits the model update δti = θ
t
i − θtG to the parameter server. As soon as Mmin of the Mround
updates are received, the parameter server applies them to obtain the model for the next round as
θt+1G = θ
t
G +
∑Mmin
i=1 αiδ
t
i , where αi = |Di|/
∑Mmin
j=1 |Dj | can be used to give more importance to
the updates δti of user i with a large dataset size |Di|, if dataset sizes are known [1].
In federated meta-learning, training steps performed by each user on θti are designed to improve
how well the model can be adapted to new classification tasks (with different output classes), instead
of improving its accuracy on a fixed task (with the same output classes for training and testing).
2
While second-order derivatives are needed to account for changes of gradients computed during
the adaptation phase, first-order approximations have been proposed, including FOMAML [8] and
Reptile [9]. In this paper, we adopt Reptile for K-shot, N -way meta-training: user i samples
B episodes (a meta-batch), each with a random set of N output classes and K training examples for
each class. For each episode j = 1, . . . , B in the meta-batch, the N ×K training examples are used
to obtain a new model θt,ji from θ
t
i through e stochastic gradient descent (SGD) steps (with inner
batch size b and learning rate η). Finally, the models obtained in each episode are averaged to update
θti locally as θ
t
i = (1− )θti + B
∑B
j=1 θ
t,j
i for some outer learning rate .
To test a model after many rounds of K-shot, N -way federated meta-training, the user generates
new episodes, each with N output classes never used during meta-training and K + 1 examples for
each class; for each episode, the shared model θtG is fine-tuned with a few SGD steps on the first K
examples of each class and tested on the N held-out examples.
3 Backdoors in Federated Meta-Learning
We consider backdoor attacks on federated meta-learning carried out by a malicious user through
data poisoning [22, 23, 5, 4]. The goal of the attacker is to introduce a persistent change in the shared
model θG such that, when a user fine-tunes θG on a new classification task, examples of a backdoor
class are classified as instances of a target class. The attacker participates in the federation, applying
the same meta-learning algorithm (Reptile) but using a poisoned dataset where examples from the
backdoor class are labeled as the target class.
For the attack to succeed, the target class must be present in the classification task of the user under
attack, and images of the backdoor class must be used as inputs. Since classes are different in each
meta-learning episode, the attacker can use multiple target and backdoor classes to increase success.
For example, in a face recognition problem, the attacker could collect online images XT of a friend
(the target class) of a member of the federation, and images XB of a few impostors (the backdoor
classes): in the training dataset of the attacker, examples of backdoor classes have the same label as
images of a target class, so that the model will learn to classify impostors as the targets.
To ensure that the attack goes unnoticed, the attacker should also include valid data during training,
so that the trained meta-model performs well on inputs that are not backdoor or target examples.
In particular, to generate an episode for K-shot, N -way meta-training, the attacker could pick
N − 1 random classes and always include the target class as the N -th model output: some of the
K examples of the target class are selected from XT , while others are selected from XB . For attack-
pattern backdoors, the attacker can also add a special visual feature to the backdoor images XB , as a
key to trigger the attack [23, 22].
Similarly to poisoning attacks in federated learning [4], after many meta-training steps on the local
model θta, the attacker sends a “boosted” update to the parameter server: δ
t
a = λ(θ
t
a − θtG), where λ
is the boosting factor (used to make this update prevail over those of other users).
4 Effects of Backdoor Attacks
In this section, we explore the effects of backdoor attacks on federated meta-learning using two
datasets, Omniglot [24] and mini-ImageNet [7, 25].
Attack Evaluation. We consider a federation of M = 4 users, where user i = 1 is the attacker and
users i = 2, 3, 4 are benign; at each round, the server selects 3 users and waits for all of their updates
(Mmin = 3). The meta-model is initially trained only by benign users, reaching state-of-the-art
accuracy; then, the attacker is selected exactly once (one-shot attack) and the poisoned update is
boosted with λ = 3. To evaluate the effectiveness of the attack, we generate K-shot, N -way episodes
from meta-training classes that always include the target class (with benign examples): after each fine-
tuning iteration, we measure accuracy on testing examples of the episode (main-task accuracy), as
well as the percentage of poisoned backdoor examples that are labeled with the target class (backdoor
accuracy); we separately evaluate backdoor accuracy on examples used by the attacker during training
(attack training) and on new examples (attack validation). We also evaluate meta-testing accuracy on
classes that were not used during meta-training. Reported accuracy is averaged over 40 episodes.
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Figure 1: Backdoor attack on Omniglot: (a) tar-
get class, (b) backdoor classes, (c) attack pattern,
(d) attack training set
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Figure 2: Backdoor attack on mini-ImageNet:
(a) target class (arctic fox), (b) backdoor class
(yawl), (c) attack pattern, (d) attack training set
Omniglot. This dataset consists of 1623 character classes from 50 alphabets, with 20 examples
per class. Similarly to previous work [9, 8, 26], we resize images to 28× 28 and augment classes
4× through rotations by multiples of 90◦: we use 1200 classes for meta-training (split among the
4 users) and 418 for meta-testing; for each meta-training class, we hold out 5 examples for validation.
We reserve 4 backdoor classes and 1 target class (Fig. 1a-b) for the attack: 10 examples of each of
these backdoor/target classes are assigned to benign clients for training, while 5 are edited to add a
backdoor key (Fig. 1c-d) and used by the attacker (labeled as the target class).
mini-ImageNet. This dataset consists of 100 classes, each with 600 examples (84 × 84 color
images). We use 64 classes for meta-training (split among 4 users) and 20 classes for meta-testing
(as in [25]); for each meta-training class, we hold out 20 examples for validation. We also reserve
1 backdoor class and 1 target class (Fig. 2a-b) for the attack: 480 examples of each of these classes
are split among benign clients for meta-training, while 100 are used by the attacker as benign
training examples. As attack and validation sets, we use additional 100 and 50 ImageNet examples,
respectively, and add a backdoor key as illustrated in Fig. 2c-d.
Note that we favor benign clients by assigning more examples to them; nonetheless (as shown later) a
backdoor attack can still be successful in federated meta-learning and benign clients are unable to
remove the backdoor with local fine-tuning.
Training Parameters. All users run Reptile on the same Conv4 model as in [8, 9], a stack of
4 modules (3x3 Conv filters with batchnorm and ReLU) followed by a fully-connected and a softmax
layer; the modules have 64 filters and 2x2 max-pooling. We adopt the same parameters as [9]:
5-shot, 5-way meta-learning, and E = 1000 episodes of 10-shot, 5-way (Omniglot) or E = 100
episodes of 15-shot, 5-way (mini-ImageNet) meta-training per round at each user, with meta-batch
sizeB = 5 and outer learning rate  = 0.1; for each episode, we use e = 10 (meta-training) or e = 50
(meta-testing) SGD steps, with inner batch size b = 10 and Adam optimizer (β1 = 0, β2 = 0.999,
initial learning rate η = 0.001). For the attacker, we use longer training with E = 50000 and 50
inner epochs (Omniglot), or E = 150000 and 1 inner epoch (mini-ImageNet); backdoor and target
examples XB and XT are always included by the attacker with 2:3 (Omniglot) or 1:2 (mini-ImageNet)
ratio.
In our first set of experiments, benign users continue federated meta-training after the attack.
Experiment 1(a). First, we consider the case where the initial meta-training by benign users do not
include correctly-labeled examples of backdoor classes. Results are illustrated in Fig. 3a (Omniglot)
and Fig. 4a (mini-ImageNet): before the attack (Round 0) meta-testing accuracy (black line) is above
99% (Omniglot) or 60% (mini-ImageNet); the attacker is selected at Round 1; then at Round 2
the accuracy of the attack (classification of backdoor images as target class) reaches 78% and 74%
on attacker’s training dataset (blue line) and 77% and 55% on the held-out validation set (green
line) for Omniglot and mini-ImageNet, respectively, while meta-testing accuracy on other classes
remains above 98% (Omniglot) and drops to 50% (mini-ImageNet). Even at Round 50 for Omniglot
and Round 100 for mini-ImageNet, after additional federated meta-training only by benign users,
backdoor accuracy is still high (50% on both attack training and validation sets for Omniglot; 68%
on the attack training set and 48% on the validation set for mini-ImageNet).
Experiment 1(b). Next, we consider the case where meta-training datasets of benign users include
correctly-labeled images of backdoor classes during pre-training, so that the model can adapt to
correctly classify them before the attack. The results are illustrated in Fig. 3b for Omniglot and Fig. 4b
for mini-ImageNet: meta-testing accuracy is still above 98% and ≈ 50% for Omniglot and mini-
ImageNet after the attack, attack accuracy is close to 92% and 76% on the attacker’s training dataset,
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(a) Backdoor examples not used by benign users
(b) Backdoor classes used in benign meta-training
(c) Backdoor classes also used in benign fine-tuning
Figure 3: Benign meta-training after attacks on
Omniglot
(a) Backdoor examples not used by benign users
(b) Backdoor classes used in benign meta-training
(c) Backdoor classes also used in benign fine-tuning
Figure 4: Benign meta-training after attacks on
mini-ImageNet
and 83% and 50% on the held-out validation set for Omniglot and mini-ImageNet, respectively; after
50 additional rounds for Omniglot, we still have 50% attack accuracy for both attack training and
validation sets and 69% and 42% (respectively) for mini-ImageNet after 100 additional rounds.
Experiment 1(c). Finally, we investigate the case where backdoor classes are present, with correct
labels, also during fine-tuning; this is particularly important to study the persistence of backdoors
in meta-learning, since fine-tuning adapts the trained meta-model to these examples. The results
are illustrated in Figs. 3c and 4c: immediately after the attack (Round 2), for Omniglot and mini-
ImageNet, meta-testing accuracy is still greater than 98% and 50%, respectively; the attack training
(validation) accuracy is close to 90% (62%) and 80% (32%), respectively, as before; however, after
additional meta-training by benign users, attack accuracy varies and degrades noticeably: since
backdoor examples are present in these additional meta-training rounds and fine-tuning iterations
with correct labels, the ability to correctly classify backdoor classes gradually improves.
From these experiments, we observe that backdoor attacks on federated meta-learning are (1) more
successful on the attack training set (especially for mini-ImageNet), since (as expected) these
examples have been used by the attacker during model poisoning, (2) similarly successful when
benign users use correctly-labeled backdoor images for meta-training, and (3) considerably less
successful when fine-tuning also includes correctly-labeled backdoor images. Irrespective of whether
correctly-labeled backdoor classes are present in the datasets of benign users, a one-shot backdoor
attack can affect the meta-model after tens of rounds of additional meta-training. To completely
remove the attack’s effects, hundreds of rounds of benign meta-training may be required without ever
selecting the attacker (which is unlikely, especially when multiple attackers are present). Therefore,
it does not appear possible to rely only on additional meta-training to remove backdoor attacks.
In our next set of experiments, we explore the effects of additional fine-tuning during each episode;
given the ability of meta-models to quickly adapt to new classification tasks, we are interested in
whether this additional fine-tuning can remove the poisoning attack from the model. Therefore, we
stop meta-training after the one-shot attack (Round 2) and start fine-tuning the meta-model at each
benign user i = 2, 3, 4 using only examples with correct labels.
Experiment 2. First, we explore the effects of additional supervised fine-tuning with the same
learning rate η = 0.001. Fig. 5 (Omniglot) and Fig. 6 (mini-ImageNet) depict results where each
column corresponds to a different user and each row considers different scenarios for the use of
backdoor classes by benign users ((a) not used, (b) used only during pre-training, (c) used also during
fine-tuning); we run e = 500 iterations of fine-tuning, 10× more than meta-testing. We observe that
fine-tuning is also unsuccessful at removing the attack: for Omniglot, both main-task accuracy (purple
line) and meta-testing accuracy (black line) are above 99% for all users. Backdoor accuracy is above
80% for all users when backdoor classes are not present during fine-tuning (Figs. 5a and 5b); when
backdoor classes are present (Fig. 5c), attack accuracy remains high for client 2, while it decreases
on both training and validation backdoor examples for clients 3 and 4. This difference is likely due to
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(a) Backdoor examples not used by benign users
(b) Backdoor classes used in benign pre-training
(c) Backdoor classes used also in benign fine-tuning
Figure 5: Benign fine-tuning (η = 0.001) after
attacks on Omniglot
(a) Backdoor examples not used by benign users
(b) Backdoor classes used in benign pre-training
(c) Backdoor classes used also in benign fine-tuning
Figure 6: Benign fine-tuning (η = 0.001) after
attacks on mini-ImageNet
(a) Backdoor examples not used by benign users
(b) Backdoor classes used in benign pre-training
(c) Backdoor classes used also in benign fine-tuning
Figure 7: Benign fine-tuning (η = 0.01) after
attacks on Omniglot
(a) Backdoor examples not used by benign users
(b) Backdoor classes used in benign pre-training
(c) Backdoor classes used also in benign fine-tuning
Figure 8: Benign fine-tuning (η = 0.05) after
attacks on Omniglot
how examples are distributed among users. For mini-ImageNet when backdoor classes are not present
during fine-tuning (Figs. 6a and 6b), accuracy is ≈ 60% (main-task) and ≈ 50% (meta-testing) for all
users. Backdoor accuracy for all users is ≈ 75% (attack training) and 50% (attack validation); when
backdoor classes are present (Fig. 6c), accuracy is ≈ 70% (main-task) and ≈ 50% (meta-testing,
clients 2 and 3) and less than 40% (meta-testing, client 4).
Experiment 3. Finally, we explore the influence of the learning rate η during fine-tuning, to check
whether backdoor accuracy can be reduced with higher learning rates. While Fig. 5 used η = 0.001
as in [9], we repeat the Omniglot experiments for η = 0.01 and η = 0.05; the results, reported in
Figs. 7 and 8, respectively, show that a larger fine-tuning learning rate reduces not only backdoor
accuracy, but also main-task and meta-testing accuracy. When backdoor classes are not present
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(a) Backdoor examples not used by benign users
(b) Backdoor classes used in benign pre-training
(c) Backdoor classes used also in benign fine-tuning
Figure 9: Benign fine-tuning of matching net-
works (η = 0.001) after attacks on Omniglot
(a) Backdoor examples not used by benign users
(b) Backdoor classes used in benign pre-training
(c) Backdoor classes used also in benign fine-tuning
Figure 10: Benign fine-tuning of matching net-
works (η = 0.001) after attacks on mini-ImageNet
during fine-tuning, attack accuracy drops from above 80% (Figs. 5a and 5b) to as low as 30% for
η = 0.01 (Figs. 7a and 7b) and as low as 20% (i.e., the accuracy of a random assignment) for
η = 0.05 (Figs. 8a and 8b). Meta-testing accuracy drops from 99% to ≈ 65% (η = 0.01) or 40%
(η = 0.05), while main task accuracy drops from nearly 100% to 96-92% (η = 0.01) and ≈ 85%
(η = 0.05). When backdoor classes are present during fine-tuning (Figs. 7c and 8c), attack accuracy
is near 0% for η = 0.01 and 0.05, while meta-testing accuracy drops from 99% (Fig. 5c) to 60%
(η = 0.01) or 40% (η = 0.05), and main task accuracy drops from nearly 100% to 90-80%.
The experiments in this section showed that federated meta-training and supervised fine-tuning cannot
remove even a one-shot backdoor attack by a single malicious user, without considerably reducing
meta-testing accuracy. In the next section, we propose an alternative defense mechanism.
5 Matching Networks as a Defense Mechanism
While defense mechanisms from backdoor attacks have been proposed for federated learning based
on the analysis of updates received from users, such approaches may violate privacy and are not
compatible with secure update aggregation by the parameter server. We propose a defense mechanism
applied by each benign user, without relying on the parameter server. The idea is inspired by matching
networks [7], a popular meta-learning framework exploiting recent advances in attention mechanisms
and external memories in neural networks.
A matching network uses the output of an embedding model fθ(x) to find similarities between
input examples and reference examples from a support set. Specifically, given the trained model
fθ(x) and a support set S = {(xi, yi)}ki=1, class yˆ = argmaxi=1,...,k P (yi|xˆ,S) is predicted where
P (yi|xˆ,S) estimates output probabilities for the input xˆ. A common model is yˆ =
∑
i a(xˆ, xi)yi,
a mixture of one-hot output vectors yi of the support set based on some attention mechanism
a(xˆ, xi) [27, 28, 29, 30]. For example, a(xˆ, xi) can be a softmax over the cosine distance c(·, ·)
of the embeddings of xˆ and xi, i.e., a(xˆ, xi) = ec(fθ(xˆ),fθ(xi))/
(∑k
j=1 e
c(fθ(xˆ),fθ(xj))
)
. More
sophisticated forms have also been proposed for improved performance [7], [31].
During training, the parameters θ of the embedding model fθ (e.g., a neural network without final
classification layer) are updated to minimize the distance of the embeddings of training examples
from those of examples with the same class in the support set. With external memories, matching
networks can switch to a different classification task simply by using the embeddings of examples in
the new support set, without supervised fine-tuning of fθ. An important characteristic of matching
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networks is that the classification of an input is not entirely determined by the parametric model fθ,
but also by the matching procedure comparing embeddings.
We adopt a variant of matching networks from [32] where (1) the output components of the embedding
model fθ are multiplied by gate variables 0 6 αl,j 6 1, and (2) cosine distances to reference examples
of each class are multiplied by a scaling factor βj . Our attention mechanism is thus a softmax over
embedding distances c(αl  fθ(xˆ), fθ(x))βl.
To fine-tune the meta-model θ (trained in federated meta-learning) in each episode, we first apply
a random Glorot initialization θg as θ′ = δθ + (1− δ)θg (to reduce the influence of the attacker’s
update), then we train αl and βl for a few iterations (with fixed θ′), and finally we train θ′, αl and
βl jointly (training is performed as in [7, Sec. 4.1]). We use δ = 0.3 and the same learning rate
η = 0.001 of backdoor experiments in Section 4. Note that this fine-tuning is not necessary for
matching networks but provides a defense against backdoor attacks, as it allows our method to
remove anomalies introduced in the embedding model fθ(x) by the attacker.
Experiment 4. Our results for Omniglot and mini-ImageNet are reported in Figs. 9 and 10,
respectively, with a column for each client and three rows for the different scenarios with respect
to the presence of backdoor classes in the datasets of benign users. Note that at epoch 0 the attack
has occurred, but fine-tuning has not started. We observe that the proposed defense mechanism can
successfully remove the backdoor attack: when backdoor classes are not present in evaluation tasks
(Figs. 9a, 9b, 10a and 10b), attack accuracy drops to about 20% (comparable to random assignment
to one of the 5 classes) in only a few epochs; when backdoor classes are present in evaluation tasks
(Fig. 9c), attack accuracy significantly drops to near 0% in a few epochs of fine-tuning (almost all
backdoor examples are correctly recognized as their corresponding true classes). Notably, meta-
testing accuracy for Omniglot (black line) in Fig. 9 is always above 96% after 50 iterations, much
higher than for supervised fine-tuning using large learning rates η (Figs. 7 and 8).
In contrast, we observe that meta-testing accuracy for mini-ImageNet is lower for matching networks,
reaching ≈ 35% in Figs. 10a and 10b, and 40% in Fig. 10c in most cases, in contrast to ≈ 50%
accuracy of Fig. 6 in most cases. This may suggest a limitation of the classification mechanism of
matching networks; other variants of matching networks, or models with non-parametric classification
mechanisms such as Prototypical Networks [31] (computing distances to prototype representations of
each class) and Relation Networks [33] (reasoning about relations among objects), could overcome
this limitation. We expect future work exploring these ideas to be fruitful.
6 Related Work
Poisoning backdoor attacks [23, 22] were shown to be effective on various kinds of machine learning
models. [5] and [4] further investigated attacks in the context of federated supervised learning
and illustrated the effectiveness and stealthiness of these attacks. Given the requirement that users
of federated learning share only updates of the model instead of training data [1], techniques
certifying that training examples are correctly classified [34, 35] are not applicable in this context,
and thus defense remains a challenging problem. Several defense mechanisms have been proposed:
[14] and [15] estimated the distribution of the training data to suppress the influence of outliers
assuming that training datasets of different users are i.i.d. The same assumption was made in
[12, 13, 19, 16, 17, 20, 21], where outliers were detected and removed according to slightly different
measures taken from the distribution of benign values (benign users were assumed to be the majority).
Even when benign users send i.i.d. updates to the parameter server, [5, 4, 6] presented successful
backdoor attacks circumventing the defenses above. To the best of our knowledge, effects and
defenses from poisoning backdoor attacks in federated meta-learning have not been explored in the
literature. Our proposed method does not require i.i.d. updates from different users, nor analysis of
updates by the parameter server.
7 Conclusions
In this work, we showed that a one-shot poisoning backdoor attack in federated meta-learning can
be very successful and persist after additional meta-learning or long fine-tuning by benign users.
Moreover, the attack can be successful also on backdoor examples that were not used by the attacker
to prepare the poisoned update. We presented a method to defend from poisoning attacks based on
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the idea of matching networks, which is compatible with privacy-friendly aggregation mechanisms at
the parameter server and effective in eliminating backdoor effects, while sacrificing some accuracy
with respect to classification mechanisms based on a fully-connected neural network layer. Our future
efforts will focus on overcoming this limitation.
Broader Impact
The context for this paper is Federated Learning (FL), a framework designed to allow users with
insufficient but confidential data to jointly train machine learning models while preserving privacy.
For example, a single hospital, clinic, or public health agency may not have sufficient data to
train powerful machine learning models providing doctors with diagnostic aid (e.g., for medical
images such as X-rays or fMRI images): FL allows multiple of these entities to jointly train more
accurate machine learning models without sharing patients’ private data. Unfortunately, FL is
known to be vulnerable to poisoning backdoor attacks, where a malicious user of the federation can
control the decisions of the model trained jointly with benign users. In the context of diagnostic
medical aid, backdoor attacks to FL could mislead doctors into making incorrect diagnoses, with
life threatening risks; similarly, consequences of backdoor attacks could be disastrous for many
applications in healthcare, transportation, finance. Although defense mechanisms have been proposed
in the literature, state-of-the-art solutions against poisoning backdoor attacks rely on third parties to
examine user updates to the model, violating the fundamental privacy motivation of FL. We believe
that an effective user-end defense mechanism can guard against backdoor attacks while preventing
unexpected abuse due to privacy leaks. Thus the broader impact of our proposed approach is that it
can prevent attacks on machine learning models that are developed jointly by multiple entities as well
as privacy-related abuse. Allowing multiple entities to jointly develop machine learning models is
critical to the broader impact of machine learning applications in settings (e.g., healthcare) where
data is scarce and sensitive.
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Appendix
In the appendix, we provide additional experimental details and results, including:
• Main-task accuracy for benign meta-training after attacks.
• Benign fine-tuning of matching networks after attacks with different values of δ.
• Benign (supervised) fine-tuning after attacks with δ = 0.3.
• Extra benign local meta-training before benign fine-tuning (supervised/matching networks)
after attacks for δ = 0.3.
• Experimental setup and run time.
A Additional Experimental Results
A.1 Main task accuracy for benign meta-training after attacks
For benign meta-training after the attacks (Figs. 3 and 4), we did not report main-task accuracy
to declutter the presentation, since accuracy on the test examples in unseen classes (meta-testing
accuracy) is more relevant to the purpose of federated meta-training. For completeness, we provide
main-task accuracy for benign meta-training after poisoning backdoor attacks in Figs. A1 and A2 for
Omniglot and mini-ImageNet experiments, respectively, which could be a useful indication of how
successful a backdoor attack might be, for a specific dataset.
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(a) Backdoor examples not used by benign users
(b) Backdoor classes used in benign meta-training
(c) Backdoor classes also used in benign fine-tuning
Figure A1: Benign meta-training after attacks on
Omniglot
(a) Backdoor examples not used by benign users
(b) Backdoor classes used in benign meta-training
(c) Backdoor classes also used in benign fine-tuning
Figure A2: Benign meta-training after attacks on
mini-ImageNet
(a) Backdoor examples not used by benign users
(b) Backdoor classes used in benign pre-training
(c) Backdoor classes used also in benign fine-tuning
Figure A3: Benign fine-tuning of matching net-
works (η = 0.001, δ = 0.6) after attacks on Om-
niglot
(a) Backdoor examples not used by benign users
(b) Backdoor classes used in benign pre-training
(c) Backdoor classes used also in benign fine-tuning
Figure A4: Benign fine-tuning of matching net-
works (η = 0.001, δ = 0.6) after attacks on mini-
ImageNet
A.2 Benign fine-tuning of matching networks with different δ
In the paper, we demonstrate results of benign fine-tuning of matching networks for δ = 0.3.
In Fig. A3 and Fig. A4, we report results of matching networks fine-tuning with δ = 0.6 for Omniglot
and mini-ImageNet, respectively (larger δ implies less randomness). Effects of backdoor attacks
can still be removed effectively in mini-ImageNet (Fig. A4): main-task accuracy and meta-testing
accuracy are similar to the case of δ = 0.3 (Fig. 10, or Fig. A7 for a different set of 40 episodes).
However, effects of backdoor attacks cannot be removed in Omniglot with δ = 0.6; results for
Omniglot with smaller values of δ (0.4 and 0.2) are also reported in Fig. A5 and Fig. A6, respectively,
for reference.
As expected, introducing more randomness (appropriately) can remove backdoor effects more
effectively; however, introducing too much randomness can damage both main task accuracy and
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(a) Backdoor examples not used by benign users
(b) Backdoor classes used in benign pre-training
(c) Backdoor classes used also in benign fine-tuning
Figure A5: Benign fine-tuning of matching net-
works (η = 0.001, δ = 0.4) after attacks on Om-
niglot
(a) Backdoor examples not used by benign users
(b) Backdoor classes used in benign pre-training
(c) Backdoor classes used also in benign fine-tuning
Figure A6: Benign fine-tuning of matching net-
works (η = 0.001, δ = 0.2) after attacks on Om-
niglot
(a) Backdoor examples not used by benign users
(b) Backdoor classes used in benign pre-training
(c) Backdoor classes used also in benign fine-tuning
Figure A7: Benign fine-tuning of matching networks (η = 0.001, δ = 0.3) after attacks on Omniglot
(different set of 40 episodes)
meta-testing accuracy due to the dominance of noise. As shown in Figs. A6a and A6b, for δ = 0.2,
main-task accuracy and meta-testing accuracy are 3% lower than in Figs. A5a and A5b (δ = 0.4). In
light of this, finding an appropriate value of δ (or, equivalently, ratio between the norms of a trained
model and an initialization) is an interesting problem and part of our future efforts.
A.3 Benign (supervised) fine-tuning after attacks for δ = 0.3
In the paper, we demonstrate results of benign (supervised) fine-tuning after attacks (Figs. 5 and 6,
for Omniglot and mini-ImageNet, respectively). We also demonstrate results of benign fine-tuning
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(a) Backdoor examples not used by benign users
(b) Backdoor classes used in benign pre-training
(c) Backdoor classes used also in benign fine-tuning
Figure A8: Benign fine-tuning (η = 0.001, δ =
0.3) after attacks on Omniglot
(a) Backdoor examples not used by benign users
(b) Backdoor classes used in benign pre-training
(c) Backdoor classes used also in benign fine-tuning
Figure A9: Benign fine-tuning (η = 0.001, δ =
0.3) after attacks on mini-ImageNet
of matching networks after attacks (Figs. 9 and 10), in which random initialization parameters are
introduced (δ = 0.3). Here we demonstrate results of benign supervised fine-tuning after attacks
when random initialization parameters are introduced (δ = 0.3 as well).
Results are reported in Fig. A8 and Fig. A9. For Omniglot (Fig. A8), supervised fine-tuning performs
similarly to our proposed fine-tuning of matching networks (Fig. 9). For mini-ImageNet, supervised
fine-tuning for cases (a) and (b) (Figs. A9a and A9b) also performs similarly to our proposed fine-
tuning of matching networks (Figs. 10a and 10b), but for case (c), attack accuracy can only be
reduced to 20% through supervised fine-tuning (Fig. A9c), while the use of matching networks
(Fig. 10c) can reduce it to less than 5% (the initial attack accuracy before the backdoor attack, due to
misclassification). This shows the effectiveness of our proposed fine-tuning of matching networks on
removing effects of backdoor attacks, particularly when benign examples in backdoor classes are
available during fine-tuning.
A.4 Extra benign local meta-training before benign fine-tuning (supervised/matching
networks) after attacks for δ = 0.3
In the previous sections, we have shown that proper randomness allows fine-tuning of matching
networks to remove the effects of backdoor attacks. In this section, we evaluate whether running
extra local meta-training based on local user data before fine-tuning can improve main-task accuracy
and meta-testing accuracy in mini-ImageNet (where it is lower).
We report results after running 100 (Figs. A10 and A11) or 1000 (Figs. A12 and A13) episodes
of additional local meta-training (Reptile) with mini-ImageNet before supervised fine-tuning or
matching networks training. We note that: (i) results shown in Figs. A10 to A13 are not significantly
different from the case without extra local meta-training (Fig. A9 for supervised fine-tuning, and
Fig. 10 for fine-tuning of matching networks), suggesting that additional local meta-training does
not improve main-task accuracy nor meta-testing accuracy; and (ii) supervised fine-tuning performs
similarly to fine-tuning of matching networks, except for Fig. A10a, in which main-task accuracy
and meta-testing accuracy drop to 20% (random guessing over 5 classes) at the beginning, with
high attack accuracy thereafter. This suggests that, by applying random initialization parameters
(with additional local training), supervised fine-tuning can behave arbitrarily and may not guarantee
removal of backdoor attacks, while fine-tuning of matching networks performs in a more robust
manner.
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(a) Backdoor examples not used by benign users
(b) Backdoor classes used in benign pre-training
(c) Backdoor classes used also in benign fine-tuning
Figure A10: Benign local meta-training ( = 0.1,
100 episodes) and fine-tuning (η = 0.001) after
attacks on mini-ImageNet (δ = 0.3)
(a) Backdoor examples not used by benign users
(b) Backdoor classes used in benign pre-training
(c) Backdoor classes used also in benign fine-tuning
Figure A11: Benign local meta-training ( = 0.1,
100 episodes) and fine-tuning of matching network
(η = 0.001) after attacks on mini-ImageNet (δ =
0.3)
B Experimental setup and run time
We implemented federated meta learning using TensorFlow [36] and Keras [37]. All experiments
are performed using 5 virtual machines (VMs) on Google Compute Engine, including 1 federated-
learning server and 4 federated-learning clients. Each client VM has 4 Intel Skylake (or later) CPUs
and 1 Nvidia Tesla T4 GPU, with 26GB of RAM and Debian 9 OS with CUDA 10.0; each server
VM has 1 Intel Skylake (or later) CPU, 3.5GB RAM, and the same version of OS and CUDA.
We report the run time of our code in the following table.
Omniglot mini-ImageNet
Pre-training (100k episodes) ≈ 250 mins ≈ 250 mins
Poisoning training
(50k episodes with 50 inner epochs for Omniglot;
150k episodes with 1 inner epoch for mini-ImageNet)
≈ 1250 mins ≈ 450 mins
Benign fine-tuning (500 iterations; repeat for 40 tasks
and present/absent of backdoor classes) ≈ 130 mins ≈ 130 mins
Benign meta-training after attack
(50 rounds for Omniglot; 100 rounds for mini-ImageNet) ≈ 80 mins ≈ 120 mins
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(a) Backdoor examples not used by benign users
(b) Backdoor classes used in benign pre-training
(c) Backdoor classes used also in benign fine-tuning
Figure A12: Benign local meta-training ( = 0.1,
1000 episodes) and fine-tuning (η = 0.001) after
attacks on mini-ImageNet (δ = 0.3)
(a) Backdoor examples not used by benign users
(b) Backdoor classes used in benign pre-training
(c) Backdoor classes used also in benign fine-tuning
Figure A13: Benign local meta-training ( = 0.1,
1000 episodes) and fine-tuning of matching net-
work (η = 0.001) after attacks on mini-ImageNet
(δ = 0.3)
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